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PAYING FOR THE HEALTH
COSTS OF SMOKING:
LOSS SHIFTING AND
LOSS BEARING
Richard C. Ausness*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cigarette smoking is known to cause cancer, heart disease, and
respiratory problems.1 Smoking is the leading cause of lung cancer2
and is also responsible for most cases of larynx, mouth, and throat
cancer.' In addition, smoking is thought to cause kidney, bladder,
pancreatic, stomach, and cervical cancer. 4 Moreover, smoking con-
tributes to coronary heart disease, arteriosclerotic peripheral vascular
disease, and aortic atherosclerosis.5 Smoking also has been linked to
various chronic obstructive lung diseases such as chronic bronchitis
and emphysema.6 Finally, smoking is suspected of causing impaired
vision, old-age retinal degeneration, reduced fertility, early meno-
pause, and even hearing loss.7
* Ashland Oil Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, B.A., 1966; J.D.,
1968, University of Florida; LL.M., 1973, Yale University.
1. See Darren S. Rimer, Secondhand Smoke Damages: Extending a Cause of Action for
Battery Against a Tobacco Manufacturer, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 1237, 1243 (1995) ("Cigarette smok-
ing causes 87% of lung cancer, 82% of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease deaths, 21% of
coronary heart disease deaths, and 18% of stroke deaths.").
2. See OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
HEALTH BENEFITS OF SMOKING CESSATION, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 107 (1990).
3. See U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOK-
ING: CANCER, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL at vi (1982).
4. See id.
5. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN-
ERAL at iv-vi (1983).
6. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CHRONIC OBSTRUCTIVE LUNG DISEASE, A REPORT OF THE SUR-
GEON GENERAL at vii (1984).
7. See Lee Nelkin, Note, No Butts About It: Smokers Must Pay for Their Pleasure, 12
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 317, 317 (1987).
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These health costs are enormous, amounting to more than $50
billion per year.' Although some of these costs are borne by smokers,
many of them are externalized to nonsmokers. 9 For example, non-
smokers who obtain first-party health insurance often pay the same
rates as smokers even though smokers receive more health-care serv-
ices than nonsmokers. 10 The same is true of publicly financed health-
care programs such as Medicaid; nonsmokers typically pay a greater
amount into these programs than smokers."
Recently, a number of states have sued tobacco companies in or-
der to recover the costs of treating smoking-related diseases through
their Medicaid programs. 12 At the present time, the parties have
agreed to a settlement that obligates the tobacco companies to pay
billions of dollars to the states over the next twenty-five years. In ad-
dition, a number of class action suits have been brought against to-
bacco companies by various groups of injured parties. The tobacco
companies have been forced to settle one of these suits and several
others are as yet unresolved. All of this suggests that tobacco compa-
nies, who traditionally have avoided liability for smoking-related inju-
ries, are now going to have to pay for some of the health costs of
smoking. In other words, some of the losses associated with smoking
are going to be shifted from individual smokers and others who cur-
rently bear them to tobacco companies and their customers.
The purpose of this Article is to examine this loss-shifting process
in more detail. The Article is largely concerned with the mechanisms
by which losses are to be shifted from one party to another and the
substantive rules that dictate when, from whom, and to whom losses
will be shifted.
Part II surveys recent developments in the area of tobacco liabil-
ity and describes some of the loss-shifting plans that have been pro-
posed during the past two decades. Part III identifies a number of
policy considerations that are relevant to loss-shifting. These include
resource-allocation efficiency, loss-spreading, corrective justice, and
8. See Mark D. Fridy, Note, How the Tobacco Industry May Pay for Public Health Care
Expenditures Caused by Smoking: A Look at the Next Wave of Suits Against the Tobacco Indus-
try, 72 IND. L.J. 235, 237 (1996) (estimating the health costs of smoking at $50 billion).
9. See Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute
Liability to Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 405 (1991).
10. See Note, Plaintiffs Conduct as a Defense to Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 99
HARV. L. REV. 809, 823 (1986).
11. See Donald W. Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 272-73
(1977).
12. See generally Fridy, supra note 8, at 235-36.
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vindication. Part IV examines a variety of loss-shifting approaches
which can be used to determine who should ultimately be held respon-
sible for smoking-related health costs. Finally, Part V sets forth a pro-
posal to reimburse public providers of social services for the costs of
treating injured smokers for smoking-related diseases. This program
is to be financed by an excise tax on the retail sale of cigarettes.
II. LOSS-SHIFrING AND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
Over the years, legal scholars have urged that smoking-related
losses be shifted from individual victims to tobacco companies and
their customers and have developed a number of proposals to achieve
this goal. But none of these schemes has ever been implemented. Re-
cently, however, tobacco companies have been forced to settle a
number of significant cases. If this trend continues, tobacco compa-
nies face the prospect of unlimited tort liability. Under these circum-
stances, the chances of a legislative solution to the loss-shifting issue
appear to be much better than they were a few years ago.
A. Past Loss-Shifting Proposals
For more than a quarter of a century, legal commentators have
proposed various administrative schemes to provide compensation to
victims of smoking-related injuries. Some of these proposals allow
claims to be brought directly against tobacco companies in a quasi-
judicial administrative proceeding; other proposals rely on revenues
from excise taxes as a source of compensation.
1. Civil Liability Systems
Professor Frank Vandall has proposed a civil liability scheme that
would avoid many of the problems of a pure tort law approach.13
Under Professor Vandall's proposal, cigarette manufacturers would be
subject to "absolute liability" for certain smoking-related injuries."
This means that tobacco companies would not be able to invoke any
defense, such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence, or prod-
uct misuse, to defeat a plaintiff's right to recover. 15 A causal relation-
ship between smoking and cancer would be presumed to exist for
claimants who have smoked at least one pack of cigarettes a day for
13. See Vandall, supra note 9, at 423-33.
14. See id. at 423.
15. See id. at 425.
19981
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fifteen years.' 6 Furthermore, this presumption could only be rebutted
by uncontradicted, clear, convincing, and unimpeached evidence.
17
Professor Vandall's compensation plan would provide benefits for
lung cancer and cancer of the larynx, oral cavity, or esophagus. 8
Compensation would be limited to these four diseases because they
are the diseases that are most commonly associated with smoking.19
In order to apply for compensation, the claimant would have to sub-
mit a statement from a physician that declared the claimant was suf-
fering from one of these forms of cancer and that the claimant's
condition was probably caused by smoking.2°
The claimant would be permitted to recover for medical ex-
penses, lost wages, and up to $100,000 for pain and suffering. 21 How-
ever, punitive damages would not be allowed under this proposal.
2 2 If
the injured party's medical expenses were covered by first-party insur-
ance, the insurance company would be reimbursed for any medical
expenses paid to hospitals or doctors,2 3 and the victim would be al-
lowed to recover for any deductibles or co-payments paid to the
insurer.2 4
Professor Donald Garner has offered a similar proposal.25 Under
what Professor Garner calls a "civil adjudication" approach, welfare
agencies would be permitted to sue cigarette companies to recover
any direct medical costs and transfer payments attributable to smok-
ing-related illnesses. 26 These cases would be decided by a special ad-
ministrative tribunal, similar to a workers compensation board. 7
Plaintiffs in these proceedings would be able to avail themselves of
certain presumptions about smoking and cancer.28 In addition, when
a patient has smoked several brands of cigarettes, the special adminis-
trative tribunal could hold tobacco companies proportionately liable
16. See id. at 424.
17. See id. at 432.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 423-24.
21. See id. at 424.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 425.
24. See id.
25. See Garner, supra note 11, at 314-19.
26. See id. at 314.
27. See id. at 319.
28. See id. at 315.
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based on the number of cigarettes of each brand that the patient
smoked.29
Recently, Professor Jon Hanson and Professor Kyle Logue have
proposed a smokers' compensation system under which smokers, fam-
ilies of smokers, and those with subrogation claims could bring their
claims before an administrative board.3" The Hanson-Logue proposal
is intended to establish an incentive-based system that forces the to-
bacco industry to internalize smoking-related health costs.3 1 Under
the Hanson-Logue proposal, the board would determine if cigarette
smoking caused the claimant's injury, possibly using presumptions in
the case of such signature diseases as lung cancer.32 The board would
also attempt to establish which cigarette brand or brands were respon-
sible for the claimant's injury.33 Finally, the board would determine
the claimant's damages and pro-rate them among the various tobacco
companies whose products were consumed by the claimant.34
2. Compensation Plans Financed by Excise Taxes
Other commentators rely on taxation, rather than civil liability, to
provide compensation for smoking-related injuries. For example,
Dean Paul LeBel has proposed the establishment of a "tobacco injury
compensation program."35 This plan would be funded by a tax on to-
bacco products. 36 Both smokers and nonsmokers would be compen-
sated for tobacco-related injuries. Eligibility for compensation would
be determined according to a statutory or administrative schedule of
harms. The occurrence of one of the symptoms set forth in the sched-
29. See id. at 316.
30. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, THE COSTS OF CIGARETTES: THE Eco-
NOMIC CASE FOR Ex POST INCENTIVE-BASED REGULATION, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1281-96 (1998).
A more detailed compensation plan will be published later this year in the Southern Illinois
University Law Journal. See Jon D. Hanson et al., Smokers' Compensation: Toward a Blueprint
for Federal Regulation of Cigarette Manufacturers, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. - (forthcoming Spring
1998).
31. Id. at 1281 ("Ex post incentive-based regulation ... would harness market forces and
manufacturer information to avoid the inefficiencies of the other regimes.").
32. Id. at 1287.
33. Id. at 1287-91.
34. The authors have suggested that determinations of individual causation, at least in the
future, might be facilitated by the issuance of "cigarette cards" for smokers. This card, which
would act somewhat like a credit card or an ATM card, could keep track of cigarette purchases
by brand and thus allow the board to pro-rate liability among cigarette companies. Id. at 1291-
95.
35. See Paul A. LeBel, Beginning the Endgame: The Search for an Injury Compensation
System Alternative to Tort Liability for Tobacco-Related Harms, 24 N. Ky. L. REV. 457, 490-93
(1997).
36. See id. at 493.
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ule would create a presumption that the claimant was entitled to com-
pensation.3 7 Individuals who were already covered by first-party
insurance could recover any deductibles or co-payments they have
paid out to their insurance companies.38 In the case of uninsured vic-
tims, the tobacco injury compensation program would pay public
health-care providers for medical services on a "pay-as-you-go" ba-
sis.39 The proposed compensation scheme would also provide a small,
largely symbolic, death benefit to the estates of individuals who have
died from smoking-related diseases.4"
Professor Garner has also proposed that a tax be levied upon cig-
arettes.41 However, unlike Dean LeBel's proposal, the tax would not
be uniform among all brands; instead, the Public Health Service
would determine which brands were safer and which were more haz-
ardous, and the tax rate would vary according to these determina-
tions.42 The purpose of a graduated tax structure would be to
encourage cigarette companies to make their products safer by giving
those who did so a competitive advantage.4 3 Money raised from the
safety tax would pay for the costs of developing methods to determine
the relative safety of cigarettes.4 4 Additional money would be given
to public welfare agencies to help pay for smoking-related welfare
expenditures.45
Another proposal, suggested by William Drayton, would tax the
tar and nicotine content of cigarettes.4 6 The purpose of this tax would
be to encourage tobacco companies to make their products safer by
reducing the amount of tar and nicotine in their cigarettes.4 7 Produ-
cers who refused to develop low-tar and low-nicotine products would
risk losing their market share to those competitors who produced
lower, and thus cheaper, tar and nicotine cigarettes.48 Under Mr.
37. See id. at 490.
38. See id. at 491.
39. See id. This would eliminate the need to calculate a lump-sum amount for future medi-
cal expenses. See id.
40. See id. at 492.
41. See Garner, supra note 11, at 327-32.
42. See id. at 327-28.
43. See id. at 327.
44. See id. at 328.
45. See id.
46. See William Drayton, Jr., The Tar and Nicotine Tax: Pursuing Public Health Through
Tax Incentives, 81 YALE L.J. 1487, 1490-1516 (1972).
47. See id. at 1494.
48. See id. at 1495.
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Drayton's proposal, tax proceeds would not be earmarked for com-
pensation but would be used for general revenue purposes.
Finally, I have proposed a national tax and compensation scheme
for smoking-related injuries.49 This proposal calls for the creation of
an administrative agency to hear adjudicated claims by injured smok-
ers.50 In order to avoid the cost of adjudicating complicated causation
issues, the agency would be authorized to establish eligibility criteria
based on the existence of certain diseases.51 The proposal would limit
compensation for victims to pecuniary losses and would provide that
disability benefits be based on uniform schedules.52 This compensa-
tion program would be financed by an excise tax on cigarettes that
would be raised or lowered periodically, depending upon past claims
experience. 3
B. Recent Developments
Until very recently, tobacco companies were able to claim that
they had never settled a case or had an adverse judgment rendered
against them.54 In the 1960s, plaintiffs relied on negligence55 and im-
plied warranty56 theories. However, tobacco companies avoided lia-
bility in such cases by claiming to have been unaware of the adverse
health effects of smoking. 7 Later, injured smokers based their claims
49. See Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alternative to
Strict Liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085, 1124-33 (1990).
50. See id. at 1125.
51. See id. at 1127-28.
52. See id. 1129.
53. See id. at 1131-32.
54. See Charles S. Griffith, III, The Legacy of the Marlboro Man, 24 N. Ky. L. REV. 593, 600
(1997) ("Prior to 1996, there had been more than eight-hundred anti-smoking lawsuits filed, but
the cigarette manufacturers had never paid a single dollar in damages."); Robert L. Rabin, A
Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 857-58 (1992) ("[O]ver a
period exceeding thirty-five years, the tobacco industry never offered to settle a single case.");
James C. Thornton, Comment, The Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for Lung Cancer: An
Analysis of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and Preemption of Strict Liability
in Tort Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 76 Ky. L.J. 569, 571 (1987-88) ("The tobacco industry
has enjoyed a life of civil immunity in a world of products liability.").
55. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), affd on
reh'g, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.
1963).
56. See, e.g., Ross v. Philip Morris, Inc., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), questioned cert. on reh'g, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963),
and rev'd and remanded, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), and rev'd and remanded on reh'g, 391
F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), and affd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969).
57. See, e.g., Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541, 542 (5th Cir. 1970) (af-
firming summary judgment for defendant on the ground that "an implied warranty under Louisi-
ana law covers only knowable, foreseeable risks"); Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 486 ("We should
1998]
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on failure to warn and defective design. But these efforts also turned
out to be unsuccessful. For example, the United States Supreme
Court concluded in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 8 that failure to
warn claims were expressly preempted by the Federal Cigarette La-
beling and Advertising Act of 1966,19 thus effectively foreclosing
claims based on inadequate warnings. The courts have also rejected
claims based on the notion that cigarettes were defective because the
risks of such products outweighed their utility.
6°
Class actions by victims of smoking have had mixed results. The
plaintiffs in Castano v. American Tobacco Co. 61 did not fare very well
at all.6" The proposed class in Castano consisted of all nicotine-depen-
dent persons in the United States and the estates, heirs, and survivors
of deceased nicotine-dependent persons.63 The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant tobacco companies fraudulently failed to inform con-
sumers that nicotine was addictive and manipulated nicotine levels in
cigarettes to maintain their addictive character. 64 The plaintiffs sought
compensatory damages, punitive damages, payment of attorneys' fees,
and other relief.65 The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion to cer-
emphasize that the medical researchers engaged by the defendant in 1952, apparently failed to
detect the danger."); Ross, 328 F.2d at 12 ("[T]he trial court correctly charged the jury and
properly refused plaintiff's instruction which would have made defendant an absolute insurer-
without regard to 'reasonableness' and without regard to 'developed human skill or foresight.').
58. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
59. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1995).
60. See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is illogical
to say that a product is defective in its generic form when 'defect' has historically been measured
in reference to the availability, or at least the feasibility, of safer alternatives."), vacated and
remanded, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), and judgment reissued, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992); Gianitsis v.
American Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D.N.H. 1988) ("Therefore, this court rules that as
a matter of law, the risk/utility theory of strict products liability as developed by Professor Wade,
is not cognizable under New Hampshire law as applied to cigarette products."); Gunsalus v.
Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("But this [risk-utility] doctrine, making
the supplier an insurer of products the judge deems too dangerous to use, impermissibly allows
judges to decide cases based upon their own views of social or personal utility."); Roysdon v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) ("[B]ecause of the lan-
guage in comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, this Court finds that
the plaintiffs did not make a prima facie case that the defendant's products are 'unreasonably
dangerous."').
61. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
62. See generally T. Dean Malone, Comment, Castano v. American Tobacco Co. and Be-
yond: The Propriety of Certifying Nationwide Mass-Tort Class Actions Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 When the Basis of the Suit Is a "Novel" Claim or Injury, 49 BAYLOR L. REV.
817 (1997).
63. See Robert T. Krebs, Note, Castano v. American Tobacco Co.: Class Treatment of Mass
Torts Is Going Up in Smoke, 24 N. Ky. L. REv. 673, 681 (1997).
64. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 737.
65. See id.
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tify the class under Rule 23(b)(3);66 however, class certification was
reversed on appeal.67 The federal circuit court concluded that the trial
court had failed to adequately determine whether the proposed class
action would be manageable in light of significant variations in state
law.68 The court also found that the class action failed to satisfy the
superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).69
The plaintiffs in Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc.70 were some-
what more successful. In Broin, a Florida intermediate appellate
court upheld the certification of a class action by thirty nonsmoking
flight attendants against Philip Morris and other cigarette manufactur-
ers.71 The proposed class consisted of approximately 60,000 present
and former flight attendants who claimed that they were injured from
exposure to secondhand smoke emitted by airline passengers.72 The
appellate court concluded that the class was sufficiently large, that
separate joinder of all of its members would be impractical, that the
claims of class members raised common issues, that the claims of the
class representatives were typical of those of other class members, and
that the class representatives could adequately represent the interests
of the other class members.73 Later, while the case was being tried,
the parties reached a settlement. The settlement provided that class
members would receive no damages for their injuries; however, the
defendants agreed to spend $300 million for the study of smoking-
related diseases.74
Perhaps the most dramatic victory for anti-smoking forces in-
volves a series of lawsuits by the states against tobacco companies to
recoup the costs that smoking-related diseases have imposed upon
Medicaid and other public health programs. Florida and Mississippi
have taken the lead in this area.
In 1994, the Florida legislature enacted a statute designed to al-
low the state to recover Medicaid costs from third parties.75 The stat-
ute created an independent cause of action and abrogated many of the
defenses that would have been available in a traditional subrogation
66. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 553-58 (E.D. La. 1995).
67. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 752.
68. See id. at 741-44.
69. See id. at 746-51; see also Malone, supra note 62, at 832-34.
70. 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review dismissed, 676 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1996).
71. See id. at 889.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 889-92.
74. See Tobacco Firms to Settle Flight Attendants' Suit, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1997, at Al.
75. See Medicaid Third-Party Liability, 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-251 (codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
409.910 (1997)).
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action.76 In 1995, the Governor ordered state officials to seek recov-
ery of Medicaid expenditures, in accordance with the provisions of the
Act, against tobacco companies. Industries affected by the Gover-
nor's order challenged the constitutionality of the statute. However,
the Florida Supreme Court found most of the Act's provisions to be
valid.77
In 1994, the Attorney General of Mississippi filed suit in equity
against the tobacco companies for recoupment of Medicaid payments
and injunctive relief.78 The complaint alleged that (1) the tobacco in-
dustry suppressed research about the addictive characteristics of nico-
tine; (2) cigarette companies manipulated and controlled nicotine
levels in their products; and (3) tobacco companies conspired to evade
state law prohibiting cigarette advertising directed at minors. 79 As the
result of this conspiracy, many of its citizens became addicted to
smoking and eventually developed health problems that required
treatment under the state's Medicaid program. 0 After the Mississippi
lawsuit was filed, a number of other states and cities followed Missis-
sippi's lead and brought Medicaid recovery suits of their own against
cigarette manufacturers.81
The Medicaid recovery litigation produced a number of embar-
rassing documents from tobacco company files,82 and a good deal of
additional information began to emerge as the result of a settlement
with Liggett in March 1996.83 In order to avoid a massive legal and
76. See Fridy, supra note 8, at 240-45; see also Jonathan S. Massey, The Florida Tobacco
Liability Law: Fairy Tale Objections to a Reasonable Solution to Florida's Medicaid Crisis, 46
FLA. L. REV. 591, 594-99 (1994) (discussing common law liability theories).
77. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Florida, Inc., 678 So. 2d
1239, 1257 (Fla. 1996).
78. See Griffith, supra note 49, at 605.
79. See Karen E. Meade, Comment, Breaking Through the Tobacco Industry's Smoke
Screen: State Lawsuits for Reimbursement of Medical Expenses, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 113, 132
(1996).
80. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr., & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effec-
tive Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63, 73 (1997) ("Moore's
equity claims were grounded in the notion that the State of Mississippi had been injured directly
by the behavior of the tobacco industry because Mississippi's taxpayers had been forced to pay
the state's Medicaid costs associated with tobacco-related illnesses.").
81. See Cliff Sherrill, Comment, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability and
Claims for Restitution, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 497, 505 (1997) ("Since May 23, 1994, when
Mississippi filed the first state claim attempting to recover from the tobacco industry based on
Medicaid expenditures, numerous other states followed suit.").
82. See Meade, supra note 79, at 133-35 (stating that documents from Brown & Williamson
demonstrated that tobacco companies suppressed information about nicotine addiction and
manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes).
83. See Fridy, supra note 8, at 235 n.3.
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public relations disaster, the tobacco companies eventually negotiated
a settlement agreement with the states in June 1997. Under the terms
of the Settlement, the tobacco companies agreed to pay $368.5 billion
dollars to the states over the next twenty-five years. In addition, the
tobacco industry gave up its fight against federal controls over nico-
tine and also agreed to accept severe restrictions on certain types of
cigarette advertising. Private lawsuits against tobacco companies were
not directly affected by the settlement.84 So far, response to the pro-
posed Settlement by public officials and health advocates has been
somewhat less than enthusiastic and it is not clear whether Congress
will enact the necessary legislation to implement it.
Some significant developments have occurred on the regulatory
front as well. For example, the federal Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") has promulgated regulations to restrict the sale of tobacco
products to minors.85 FDA regulations also limit advertisements that
reach children to black-and-white text-only formats,86 prohibit to-
bacco advertising within a 1,000 foot radius of schools, 87 and bar to-
bacco companies from sponsoring sporting events.88
All in all, the last few years have not been good for tobacco com-
panies. Their traditional markets in the United States are declining,89
and they face the prospect of massive tort liability and hostile regula-
tion by government agencies. Tobacco companies and their customers
are almost certainly going to have to pay for some of the costs of
smoking-related injuries; the only question is how much they will have
pay and to whom.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Loss-shifting rules promote various social policies. For example,
loss-shifting may encourage a more efficient allocation of resources, or
it may serve as a tool to spread primary accident costs. In addition,
loss-shifting may be used to achieve corrective justice goals or it may
serve a vindicatory function. Unfortunately these social policies are
84. See Tobacco Industry, Attorneys General Enter into Historic $368 Billion Settlement, 32
MEALEY'S Lrr. REP.: INS., June 24, 1997, at 3.
85. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless To-
bacco Products To Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996).
86. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a) (1997).
87. See id. § 897.30(b).
88. See id. § 897.34(c).
89. See Erica Swecker, Note, Joe Camel: Will "Old Joe" Survive?, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1519, 1521 (1995) (stating that the number of smokers has been declining steadily by one million
consumers each year for some time).
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not always consistent with each other. Therefore, one must make pol-
icy choices before choosing among various loss-shifting alternatives.
A. Resource Allocation
Loss-shifting may promote a more efficient allocation of re-
sources by forcing firms to internalize the costs of dangerous products
and activities. If producers are able to shift accident costs to others,
they have little incentive to make their products safer. However,
when they are forced to compensate injured parties, firms will spend
more money on product safety as long as the marginal cost of safety
measures is less than the marginal reduction of expected liability
costs. 90
Furthermore, even if a product cannot be made safer, liability
rules that force the producer to internalize accident costs, can still
serve a resource allocation function by increasing the cost of the prod-
uct. This is desirable because the prices of goods ought to reflect the
true costs of production in order to enable the market to allocate re-
sources efficiently.91 If a producer is not required to pay the full costs
of production, the price of its product will be artificially low. This, in
turn, defeats the signaling function of prices, causing demand for the
product (assuming that demand is responsive to price) to be higher
than it would be if the product's price reflected its true production
costs. This leads to overconsumption of the product.9" The costs of
product-related injuries may properly be considered as a cost of pro-
duction. If the costs of injuries are externalized, the prices of danger-
ous products will be artificially low, demand for such products will be
artificially high, and product-related accidents costs will be higher
than they should be. On the other hand, producers who are required
to compensate injured consumers will be forced to raise their prices,93
causing the prices of dangerous products to rise and the demand for
90. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprison-
ment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 768 (1983) ("[A] manufacturer will re-
spond to threatened liability by investing in safety up to, but not beyond, the point at which the
marginal costs of the investment equal the marginal costs of accidents thereby avoided.").
91. See Ellen Wertheimer, Pandora's Humidor: Tobacco Producer Liability in Tort, 24 N.
Ky. L. REV. 397, 407 (1997) ("From an economic standpoint, the correct price of a product
should reflect all its costs. Only then can one accurately assess the level of demand for that
product.").
92. See Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for
the Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 81, 104 (1994).
93. See Andrew 0. Smith, The Manufacturer and Distribution of Handguns as an Abnor-
mally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 376 (1987) ("Under a strict liability regime,
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such products to fall.94 As consumption of dangerous products falls,
so will the accident costs associated with such products.95
B. Loss-Spreading
Some have suggested that the economic dislocation associated
with product-related injuries (known as secondary accident costs) can
be reduced if accident costs are spread among a large group instead of
being borne entirely by individual victims. 96 The economic justifica-
tion for this notion is the declining marginal utility of money theory
according to which each additional dollar, as a person's wealth in-
creases, provides less utility than the previous dollar.97 The theory of
loss-spreading assumes that overall utility is increased if the high-util-
ity dollars lost by accident victims are replaced by lower-utility dollars
provided by a large pool of loss-bearers.
In the case of product-related injuries, it is assumed that produ-
cers are generally in a better position to spread these losses than con-
sumers.98 Ordinarily, producers can compensate those who are
injured by their products (either directly or through the purchase of
manufacturers will face a higher marginal cost curve and will correspondingly charge higher
prices.").
94. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Lia-
bility Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263, 1273 (1991)
("[Diefect-free products liability would reduce the consumption of relatively risky products by
increasing their monetary costs to users and consumers, thereby placing such products at a com-
petitive disadvantage in the market.").
95. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Extending the Boundaries of Strict Procducts Liability:
Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1040 (1980) ("[B]y
causing the prices of products and services to reflect more fully their defect-related accident
costs, strict liability helps to reduce... overconsumption and thus to reduce the overall costs of
defect-related accidents.").
96. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 772, 794 (1985) ("Spreading the impact of loss over time or among a class of individuals
will decrease economic dislocation, thereby reducing secondary costs.").
97. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-
and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1794 (1995) ("That principle holds
that, in general, the marginal utility a person derives from her first dollar is greater than the
marginal utility the person derives from her second dollar."); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation,
Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 70 (1990) ("Most people believe that
money is subject to declining marginal utility. That is, as a person's wealth increases, she derives
less utility from each individual dollar.").
98. See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1980) ("The manufacturer
can spread risk through insurance and price adjustments, whereas the individual might suffer a
crushing blow underwriting the loss himself."); Kathleen M. McLeod, Note, The Great American
Smokeout: Holding Cigarette Manufacturers Liable for Failing to Provide Adequate Warnings of
the Hazards of Smoking, 27 B.C. L. REV. 1033, 1072 (1986) ("One of the principal purposes of
the imposition of strict liability is to ensure that the injured party does not bear the cost of
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liability insurance) and then pass the cost of compensation on to their
customers in the form of higher prices.99 Furthermore, because pro-
ducers generally sell their products to a mass market, the incremental
cost to each customer of compensating accident victims is likely to be
quite small.100
C. Corrective Justice
Some commentators believe that moral principles have an impor-
tant role to play in the imposition of liability.' 0' One such considera-
tion is corrective justice, which is concerned with rectifying wrongful
gains and losses.1"2 The traditional concept of corrective justice is lim-
ited to cases of unjust enrichment, such as theft, where one party di-
rectly gained something at the expense of another. 103 In such cases,
restitution satisfied the requirements of corrective justice by returning
the property to its rightful owner and by depriving the wrongdoer of
any ill-gotten gains.' 4 Some theorists also felt that the concept of cor-
rective justice required those who engaged in dangerous behavior to
compensate those who were injured even though the wrongdoer did
not directly profit from the victim's injury.'0 5 Thus, a tortfeasor who
negligently caused a personal injury to another could be required to
compensate the injured party. Today, principles of corrective justice
injuries caused by a defective product; rather, the manufacturer who can spread the cost among
all consumers by pricing the product bears the cost.").
99. See Page Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1966) ("The assumption is that the manufacturer can shift the loss to
the consumers by charging higher prices for the products.").
100. See James B. Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel Under Assault, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 13, 16 (1978) ("Since the retailer, manufacturer and others participating in the mar-
keting chain possess a reasonably vast marketing public, the proportionate increase in cost to the
public is theoretically minimal when compared to the loss suffered by the injured consumer.").
101. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward
First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 430 (1993) ("At bottom, product accidents are
moral-not technological events, and so the law of products liability should turn on moral theory
in establishing its fundamental principles."); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort
Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802-03 (1997)
(discussing the corrective justice writings of George Fletcher, Richard Epstein, Jules Coleman,
and Ernest Weinrib).
102. See Ausness, supra note 49, at 1093.
103. See id. at 1094 (discussing Aristotle's theory of corrective justice).
104. See Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 297, 330
("In most restitution cases-for example, when the defendant acquires property from the plain-
tiff by theft or fraud-there is both a loss to the plaintiff and a corresponding gain to the defend-
ant. This correlation of gain and loss gives the restitutionary claim strong appeal in terms of
fairness and corrective justice.").
105. See Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 423
(1982).
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have even been invoked to support the theory of enterprise liability
under which businesses that engage in beneficial activities which nec-
essarily impose risks on others are deemed to have a moral obligation
to compensate those who are injured.
10 6
D. Vindication
Loss-shifting may act as a form of vindication for those who have
suffered injury at the hands of a wrongdoer. 107 The adjudicative pro-
cess provides a public forum for victims to tell their story and to re-
ceive comfort and emotional support from the community. 108 In
addition, compensation may help victims of wrongdoing to overcome
their sense of indignation and outrage.'0 9 Payments to accident vic-
tims can also reinforce community norms of conduct and rectitude by
providing a degree of public accountability for those who violate
them."0 In particular, moral values are strengthened when powerful
violators, such as government institutions and large corporations, are
held accountable.
IV. ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY SCHEMES
This section will evaluate various loss-shifting options in terms of
their relative ability to achieve the policy objectives discussed in Part
106. See Fleming James, Jr., An Evaluation of the Fault Concept, 32 TErm. L. REV. 394, 399-
400 (1965) ("This point of view, which may be called enterprise liability, is most simply stated by
the proposition that an activity.., should pay for the accident loss it causes because, as a general
proposition, each enterprise in our society should pay its own way.").
107. See Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Reassessment of the Current Con-
ceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 783-85 (1987) (discussing the need to respond to
the "sense of injustice" felt by accident victims).
108. See Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise of Neocontract, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 1177, 1218 (1990) ("This opportunity to speak and be heard about personal tragedy may be
the most important feature of tort for accident victims, more important in some ways than ob-
taining monetary compensation."); Joseph W. Little, Up With Torts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861,
869 (1987) ("Damaged people want compensation; there is no denying that. They also want
accountability, which in a civilized society means access to a forum and a set of rules by which
they may publicly prove themselves right and someone else wrong.").
109. See Ingber, supra note 96, at 781 ("Compensation may restore the plaintiff's sense of
self-value, and erase his sense of outrage.").
110. See Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39
WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1227 (1993) ("This goal [of vindication] is achieved through compensating
the victim, the sense of retribution and rectification that attaches to that compensation and the
reallocation of loss that takes place."); Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibility for Human Suffering:
Awareness, Participation, and the Frontiers of Tort Law, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 470, 504 (1993)
("Tort law not only remedies injustice by imposing damage awards, it also exposes normative
features of relations between parties by articulating and applying conceptions of
responsibility.").
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III. Potential ultimate loss-bearers include tobacco companies, smok-
ers, and governmental providers of social welfare programs like Medi-
caid. Potential beneficiaries of such loss shifting include injured
smokers, injured nonsmokers, and public social services providers.
A. Resource Allocation
Although smoking generates enormous health costs, many of
these costs are externalized to nonsmokers."1 Consequently, ciga-
rette prices do not reflect the true cost of smoking to society. This
causes economic resources to be misallocated because smokers spend
money on smoking that they would otherwise spend for other pur-
poses if cigarette prices were higher.112 This inefficiency can be cor-
rected by shifting smoking-related losses from individual victims to
producers or consumers of cigarettes.
1. Tobacco Companies as Potential Loss-Bearers
Tobacco companies, who directly profit from the sale of ciga-
rettes, appear to be ideal targets for loss-shifting. Those who might
benefit from such loss-shifting include injured smokers, nonsmokers
who are harmed as a result of exposure to secondhand smoke, and
public institutions which provide free social services to injured
smokers.
When individual smokers are injured, they are often left to bear
their losses alone. These losses include uncompensated pecuniary
losses such as lost employment income, fire losses, and health-care
costs that smokers actually incur.113 Each year, these direct economic
losses amount to many billions of dollars." 4 Of course, smokers
whose health is impaired by smoking are also afflicted by the pain and
suffering associated with their diseases.
An argument, based on resource-allocation grounds, can be made
for shifting these costs from injured smokers to tobacco companies. If
111. See Note, supra note 10, at 823 ("Those smoking-related health care costs not paid for
by public programs are largely absorbed into private-sector loss spreading mechanisms-like
pooled health insurance-and are consequently not reflected in the price of cigarettes or in other
costs borne only by smokers.").
112. See id. at 824.
113. This Article treats smokers and first-party insurers as the same because such private
insurers usually can recover claims paid to the victim by enforcing subrogation rights if the vic-
tim obtains compensation from a tortfeasor.
114. Estimates of the costs of smoking vary considerably. See Vandall, supra note 9, at 405-
06 ("Cigarette smoking costs the nation more than $52 billion annually in health care and lost
productivity.").
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the costs of smoking currently borne by injured smokers are shifted to
tobacco companies, the price of cigarettes will rise substantially if to-
bacco companies pass these costs on to their customers. This, in turn,
will cause the actual cigarette consumption rate to move closer to an
efficient level.' 15
Injured nonsmokers are also appropriate beneficiaries of loss-
shifting. Secondhand or sidestream smoke is known to contain high
concentrations of harmful substances 16 and, according to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency and the Surgeon General, causes about
3,000 deaths to nonsmokers each year.117 In addition, many other
nonsmokers are harmed, though not killed, as the result of exposure
to secondhand smoke. 1 8 At the present time, these costs are entirely
externalized to nonsmokers. In theory, it would be entirely appropri-
ate to require tobacco companies to assume responsibility for the
health costs associated with secondhand smoke.119 Although the costs
imposed on tobacco companies would be relatively modest, some in-
crease in cigarette prices would still occur if tobacco companies were
required to pay nonsmokers for the harm they suffer from secondhand
smoke. o
Finally, public social services providers can also assert a legiti-
mate claim to compensation for the costs of providing health care to
indigent smoking victims. Smoking imposes a tremendous financial
115. Of course, the consumption level would still be sub-optimal if nonsmokers and govern-
ment entities continued to bear some of the costs of smoking.
116. See James W. Henges, Note, Cigarettes: Defectively Designed or Just Extremely Danger-
ous?, 18 OKLA. Crr U. L. REV. 559, 577 (1993) ("Sidestream smoke contains more than five
times the ammonia, three times the carbon monoxide, and twice as much tar and nicotine than
mainstream smoke.").
117. See U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS
(1993); see also David B. Ezra, Note, Smoker Battery: An Antidote to Second-Hand Smoke, 63
So. CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1065 (1990) (citing a study that attributed 2,490 to 5,160 lung cancer
deaths a year to secondhand smoke exposure).
118. See Gregory P. Taxin, Tobacco Industry Liability for Cigarette-Related Injuries: "Smok-
ers, Give It Up!", 16 J. PROD. & Toxics LIABILITY 221, 237 (1994) ("Moreover, smokers cause
nonsmokers to suffer illnesses and diseases ranging from respiratory irritations to nonfatal heart
diseases.").
119. See LeBel, supra note 35, at 486 ("A compensation program that was limited to environ-
mental smoke victims would be easiest to justify on cost internalization grounds.").
120. Using a rough-and-ready method of calculation, I would attribute a cost of $1 million
per death for a total annual cost of $3 billion for fatalities attributable to secondhand smoke
exposure. Nontrivial health effects which do not result in death might account for another $2
billion. The total cost, therefore, would be about $5 billion. Assuming that 24 billion packs of
cigarettes are sold annually, the cost of compensating nonsmokers would be about two cents a
pack (plus the cost of operating the compensation mechanism).
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burden on all levels of government.12' The cost to public programs,
like Medicaid, of treating smoking-relating diseases has been esti-
mated to be more than $20 billion, 22 and the overall cost to the gov-
ernment could be as high as $50 billion. 123 A strong resource-
allocation argument can be made that these costs should be shifted
from government health-care providers to tobacco companies. This
sort of loss-shifting will significantly increase the cost of cigarettes
124
and will thereby cause cigarette consumption to decline accordingly.
2. Smokers as Potential Loss-Bearers
The resource-allocation argument assumes that tobacco compa-
nies will ultimately pass on to smokers any health-care costs that are
initially shifted to them. Thus, smokers, rather than tobacco compa-
nies, may be the ultimate bearers of any smoking-related losses that
are initially shifted to tobacco companies. The potential beneficiaries
of such loss shifting could be injured smokers, injured nonsmokers,
and public providers of social services.
Injured smokers already bear some of the health-related costs of
smoking, such as loss of employment income, pain and suffering, as
well as health care costs that are not paid for by someone else. Argua-
bly, these costs should be shifted from individual injured smokers to
smokers-at-large. For purposes of an efficient allocation of resources,
it does not matter whether smokers pay for smoking-related health
costs in the form of higher retail prices or whether they pay an excise
tax imposed at the time of sale. In either case, losses will be shifted to
smokers in a way that affects cigarette consumption levels. As men-
tioned earlier, the health-care costs of smoking are sufficiently high
that shifting them from individually injured smokers to smokers-at-
large would have a significant effect on cigarette prices.
Perhaps injured nonsmokers should be compensated as well. If
tobacco companies are held liable for injuries caused by secondhand
smoke, one would expect them to raise prices accordingly. The same
121. See Meade, supra note 79, at 124-25.
122. See Michael K. Mahoney, Comment, Coughing Up the Cash: Should Medicaid Provide
for Independent State Recovery Against Third-Party Tortfeasors Such as the Tobacco Industry?,
24 B.C. EN vrL. A'. L. REV. 233, 238 (1996) (reporting that the cost of treating smoking-related
illnesses to Medicaid and similar programs was 89 cents a pack times 24 billion packs of
cigarettes).
123. See Fridy, supra note 8, at 237 (reporting that governments spend $50 billion per year to
treat smoking-related illnesses).
124. Shifting $20 billion in public health care costs to 24 billion packs of cigarettes would
result in a price increase of 89 cents a pack. See Mahoney, supra note 122, at 238.
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result would presumably occur if these costs were recouped from
smokers directly through some sort of direct tax or surcharge. In
either case, the private cost of smoking would more closely resemble
its social cost.
Public providers of social services may also make a claim to com-
pensation under a resource-allocation rationale. Smokers currently
externalize substantial costs to government health-care and social wel-
fare programs.125 Arguably, economic resources will be allocated
more efficiently if these costs are reflected in the prices smokers pay
for cigarettes.
3. Public Social Services Providers as Potential Loss-Bearers
Some legal scholars have proposed that accident costs, including
those caused by defective or inherently dangerous products, be com-
pensated by broad social welfare programs funded by general tax rev-
enues.1 26 Whatever the merits of such proposals, they would not, and
are not intended to, internalize accident costs. To achieve a better
allocation of resources, the smoking-related health-care costs must be
borne by tobacco companies or smokers, not public social services
providers. Therefore, if we wish to achieve a more efficient allocation
of economic resources, smoking-related losses should not be shifted to
public providers of social services; rather, such costs should be shifted
from social services providers to tobacco companies and smokers.
4. Problems with the Resource-Allocation Rationale
The loss-shifting alternatives described above may have some po-
tential drawbacks. For example, it is possible that additional cost-in-
ternalization is not necessary because existing excise taxes and high
smoker mortality already offset the social costs of smoking. It is also
possible that massive loss-shifting might destroy the tobacco industry.
Another concern is that cost internalization will not lead to a more
efficient allocation of resources because tobacco companies will not
raise their prices. Conversely, consumer demand may be so inelastic
that even substantial price increases will not affect cigarette consump-
125. See Note, supra note 10, at 823 ("Cigarette smoking imposes a massive burden on all
levels of government, through the cost of government-sponsored health and welfare benefits, the
loss of tax revenues due to illness and premature death, and the cost of supporting the families of
smoking's victims.").
126. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558, 642-51
(1985) (proposing that tort law be replaced by expanded social welfare programs to pay accident
victims for disability and medical expenses).
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tion rates. Finally, higher cigarette prices may encourage consumers
to abandon cigarettes for even more dangerous substitutes.
a. Unwarranted Shifting of Losses to Smoking
Assuming that the purpose of internalizing health-care costs is to
assure that cigarette prices reflect the true social costs of production,
it may be necessary to make some adjustments in order to prevent
cigarette prices from actually exceeding the social costs of smoking.
For example, the price of cigarettes already includes the cost of state
and federal excise taxes. In the aggregate, these taxes exceed $20 bil-
lion per year.12 7 Any additional loss-shifting that occurred would
have to take account of existing levels of taxation so that smokers
would not be saddled with more than their share of the health-care
burden.
A related argument assumes that the social costs of smoking are
already fully internalized because smokers die sooner than non-
smokers and, therefore, actually use fewer social services than non-
smokers.12 8 A recent study by the Rand Corporation concluded that
smokers actually subsidize nonsmokers at a level of 68 cents per pack
(in nondiscounted dollars) due to their higher mortality rates.12 9 Even
if costs and benefits are discounted, causing smokers to receive a net
benefit of 38 cents per pack,13 ° this benefit is more than offset by the
excise taxes smokers pay to the government.131
b. Tobacco Company Bankruptcies
If smoking-related health care costs are shifted to tobacco compa-
nies or smokers, the resulting price increases may be so great that con-
sumers will refuse to buy cigarettes and tobacco companies will go out
of business. However, while the demise of the tobacco industry might
have negative short-term economic consequences, in theory, the over-
127. See Jendi B. Reiter, Citizens or Sinners?-The Economic and Political Inequity of "Sin
Taxes" on Tobacco and Alcohol Products, 29 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 443, 444 n.2 (1996).
128. See Taxin, supra note 118, at 239-40 ("Because smokers die earlier than nonsmokers,
smokers pay more in social insurance taxes as a proportion of what they demand in payouts,
require less collectively financed nursing home care, and draw less pension money."); Christo-
pher May, Note, Smoke and Mirrors: Florida's Tobacco-Related Medicaid Costs May Turn Out to
Be a Mirage, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1077-78 (1997) (discussing possible savings to government
social programs due to the lower life expectancies of smokers).
129. See Willard G. Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their
Way?, 261 JAMA 1604, 1606, (1989).
130. See id. at 1608. This is because the health-care costs of smoking occur early, while the
benefits to society from early death are postponed until later.
131. See Taxin, supra note 118, at 241.
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all effect will be positive, assuming that tobacco companies go out of
business because consumers are not willing to pay for the true cost of
smoking. In other words, fears of tobacco company bankruptcy are
irrelevant as far as resource-allocation goals are concerned.132
c. Failure by Tobacco Companies to Pass Costs on to
Consumers
Another concern is that tobacco companies will not pass on their
increased production costs to consumers if smoking-related health-
care costs are shifted to them. The American tobacco industry is a
highly profitable,'133 six-firm oligopoly.'34  Unlike competitive indus-
tries, which would be forced to pass increases in production costs on
to consumers, tobacco companies could afford to absorb some of the
costs that are shifted to them and might choose to do so in order to
maintain existing sales levels. If this occurred, cigarette prices would
remain the same and consumption rates would not change.' 35
However, there is a limit to the costs that tobacco companies can
absorb in this fashion. If only the costs associated with secondhand
smoke were shifted to tobacco companies, they might indeed be
tempted to absorb some or all of these costs. However, if all of the
health costs currently borne by injured smokers and government
health-care programs were shifted to tobacco companies, they would
certainly have to pass them on to consumers.
d. Inelasticity of Consumer Demand
The resource-allocation rationale assumes that cigarette con-
sumption will go down if prices go up (unless a substantial consumer
surplus exists in the existing price structure). 136 However, it is possi-
ble that the demand for cigarettes will not be responsive to price in-
132. See Wertheimer, supra note 91, at 406.
133. See Clara Sue Ross, Comment, Judicial and Legislative Control of the Tobacco Industry:
Toward a Smoke-Free Society?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 332 (1987) ("The tobacco industry in the
United States ranks among the top five industries in terms of sales, assets, and profits.").
134. See Reiter, supra note 127, at 462 ("The cigarette industry in America is essentially a
six-firm oligopoly."). The tobacco cartel consists of R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, Liggett & My-
ers Company, American Brands, Lorillard Company, and Brown & Williamson Industries. See
Ross, supra note 128, at 332. These six companies control 99.8% of the market. See Rimer,
supra note 1, at 1270.
135. See Ausness, supra note 49, at 1111-12.
136. The difference between the price that consumers actually pay for a product and the
price that they would be willing to pay is known as the consumer surplus. See Kim D. Larsen,
Note, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An Economic Analysis,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 2045, 2054 (1984).
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creases because smokers are addicted to smoking and cannot quit.13 7
In fact, there is some evidence that older smokers do not change their
smoking habits in response to price increases. 138 On the other hand,
cigarette consumption by younger smokers does appear to decline as
the price of cigarettes increases.'39 Thus, it is hard to say how much
cigarette consumption rates will decline if cigarette prices are
increased.
e. "Second Best" Problems
A final concern is that smokers will turn to cheaper, but more
dangerous, substitutes for smoking if loss-shifting causes cigarette
prices to rise. 14  This phenomenon is an example of the theory of the
"second best." According to this theory, if government regulation or
tort liability greatly increases the cost of a product or activity, consum-
ers will seek unregulated substitutes that will be cheaper, but possibly
more dangerous, than the regulated ones.' 4 1 For example, if cigarette
prices rise, smokers may turn to bootleg cigarettes, smokeless tobacco
products, or even illegal drugs.
1 41
B. Loss-Spreading
Loss-spreading is concerned with the prevention of secondary ac-
cident costs. This objective is best achieved by shifting losses from
individual victims to those who can spread them more cheaply or
efficiently.
137. See Ronald W. Eades, A Comment on Professor Paul A. LeBel's Ideas for A Tobacco
Injuries Compensation System, 24 N. Ky. L. REV. 495, 503 (1997) ("The fact that tobacco has an
addictive nature, may encourage consumers to continue purchasing the product above a price
that would have forced other products off the market.").
138. See Kenneth E. Warner, Smoking and Health Implications of a Change in the Federal
Cigarette Excise Tax, 255 JAMA 1028, 1029 (1986).
139. See Ross, supra note 133, at 337 ("Most smokers begin smoking as teenagers or young
adults and it is this age group that is most responsive to price changes and has the most elastic
demand for tobacco.").
140. See Richard C. Ausness, Product Category Liability: A Critical Analysis, 24 N. Ky. L.
REV. 423, 445-46 (1997).
141. See generally Henderson, supra note 95, at 1059-65.
142. Smuggling from the United States did occur on a large scale in Canada when the Cana-
dian government increased the excise tax on cigarettes to $4.44 a pack. See W. Kip Viscusi,
Promoting Smokers' Welfare with Responsible Taxation, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 547, 555 (1994).
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1. Tobacco Companies as Potential Loss-Bearers
The loss-spreading rationale arguably supports the shifting of
smoking-related losses to tobacco companies.14 3 The market for to-
bacco products is huge: almost 50 million Americans currently smoke
and tobacco companies sell more than 24 billion cigarettes per year.144
On the other hand, the number of smokers has been declining steadily
for many years 145 and is likely to shrink even more as the result of
government attempts to discourage cigarette sales to teenagers. Con-
sequently, policymakers must acknowledge that there are limits to the
tobacco industry's ability to pay for smoking-related injuries.
Injured smokers are obvious candidates for compensation under
a loss-spreading rationale. As mentioned earlier, injured smokers cur-
rently bear many of the health-care costs of smoking, both pecuniary
and nonpecuniary. Some of these losses are no doubt spread by first-
party insurance, but many smokers, particularly those in lower socio-
economic groups,146 do not have adequate private insurance. 47
Moreover, private insurance does not provide compensation for pain
and suffering or other nonpecuniary losses that injured smokers in-
cur.148 Nonsmokers who are injured by secondhand smoke are in pre-
cisely the same position as injured smokers as far as loss-spreading
considerations are concerned. Although many victims will be insured
by private insurance companies, others may have to bear the cost of
smoking-related injuries on their own unless their losses are shifted to
tobacco companies.
Of course, many of those who suffer smoking-related injuries rely
upon public health care and disability programs for assistance. It
might seem desirable to shift these costs to tobacco companies as well.
On the other hand, governmental institutions are excellent loss-
spreaders themselves. They typically have significant financial re-
sources and can use their taxing power to secure more money if
143. See Vandall, supra note 9, at 414 ("The reasoning behind reallocating the loss is that the
cigarette manufacturer is in a better position than the nonsmoker and society in general to bear
the damages caused by smoking.").
144. See Mahoney, supra note 122, at 235.
145. See Swecker, supra note 89, at 1521 ("In the United States, the number of smokers has
declined steadily by one million each year.").
146. See Alan Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L. REV. 509, 526-
27 (1989) (stating that persons of low social and economic status are more likely to smoke than
individuals at higher social and economic levels).
147. See Gangarosa et al., supra note 92, at 91 ("In recent years, the uninsured population
has expanded to 37 million people.").
148. See Sugarman, supra note 126, at 648 ("[P]ain and suffering are generally not compensa-
ble from social-insurance, employee-benefit, or private-insurance schemes.").
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needed. From the perspective of loss-spreading, therefore, it may be
better to allow smoking-related health costs to fall on government
health-care providers rather than shifting them to tobacco companies.
2. Smokers as Loss-Bearers
The argument for shifting smoking-related health-care costs to
smokers is similar to the argument for shifting it to tobacco compa-
nies. Smokers constitute a large pool of potential loss-bearers and the
activities of this group generates a need for compensation. As far as
loss-spreading is concerned, it does not matter whether smokers pay
for the health-care costs of smoking directly through taxation or indi-
rectly though the payment of higher cigarette prices.
It seems appropriate to shift smoking-related losses from individ-
ual injured smokers to smokers as a group. Each smoker participates
in an activity that is certain to harm some members of the group, and
the group is large enough to absorb a significant amount of smoking-
related losses. Smokers are also able to spread the health-care costs
sustained by nonsmokers since injured nonsmokers are a much
smaller group than injured smokers. Furthermore, it seems appropri-
ate to place the responsibility for compensating injured nonsmokers
on smokers because they are the physical cause of injuries suffered by
nonsmokers. On the other hand, the loss-spreading rationale does not
provide a convincing justification for shifting smoking-related losses
from public social services providers to smokers when public entities
are better loss-spreaders.
3. Public Social Services Providers as Potential Loss-Bearers
Because governmental entities are frequently good loss-spread-
ers, an argument can be made for requiring them to pay for at least
some of the smoking-related health-care costs incurred by injured
smokers. At the present time, the government already acts as a loss-
spreader for veterans, indigent persons, and the elderly. On the other
hand, moral considerations, to be discussed later, militate against a
government-financed program that would compensate injured smok-
ers in general.
4. Problems with the Loss-Spreading Rationale
Secondary accident costs can be minimized by shifting smoking-
related health-care costs from injured smokers to those with greater
resources or greater loss-spreading capacity. Tobacco companies,
smokers, and public social services providers all have some ability to
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spread losses. At the same time, many of the concerns discussed in
connection with resource allocation goals are not relevant when the
primary focus is on loss-spreading. For example, loss-spreading is not
concerned with internalizing primary accident costs. Consequently,
the best loss-bearer is not necessarily the one who has caused the
losses. In addition, loss-spreading is not concerned with influencing
consumption patterns.
However, some potential concerns must be addressed if loss-
spreading is to be the principal rationale for liability. First of all, loss-
spreading is concerned with the financial health of the loss-bearing
enterprise because a firm that goes out of business cannot continue to
function as a loss-spreader. In addition, "second best" issues are also
troublesome because the loss-spreading capacity of an enterprise may
be compromised if consumers turn to cheaper substitutes for the loss-
bearing product or activity.
a. Tobacco Company Bankruptcies
The health-care costs of smoking are enormous. Even the most
conservative estimates place these costs at $50 billion per year.14 9
Even if we take the $20 billion that tobacco companies and smokers
already pay in taxes and devote it to loss-spreading, tobacco compa-
nies would still be required to provide another $30 billion per year if
they are expected to spread all smoking-related health costs. Given
the fact that the U.S. market for cigarettes is already shrinking,150 one
might legitimately question whether tobacco companies and smokers
have the ability to spread all of these costs.
It is important to note the difference between resource allocation
and loss-spreading perspectives on this issue. When the principal con-
cern is resource allocation, it is all right if a company, or even an en-
tire industry, goes out of business when it cannot pay for the costs it
imposes on society. However, the situation is entirely different when
the primary concern is loss-spreading. An enterprise that has gone
out of business or has become financially troubled will not be able to
spread losses.151 Consequently, if tobacco companies or smokers are
149. See Vandall, supra note 9, at 405-06 (estimating health care and productivity losses at
$52 billion).
150. See Swecker, supra note 89, at 1521 (stating that the number of smokers is declining by
one million each year).
151. See Ausness, supra note 49, at 1120 ("[I]f the tobacco industry experienced severe eco-
nomic decline, or went out of business altogether, it would no longer be able to spread losses.").
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expected to act as loss-spreaders, the burden imposed upon them must
not exceed their ability to pay.152
b. "Second Best" Problems
The theory of the "second best" is also relevant to loss-spreading.
If the price of cigarettes is significantly increased, smokers may seek
cheaper substitutes. This is undesirable from a resource-allocation
perspective because smokers might turn to even more dangerous sub-
stitutes. It is also undesirable from a loss-spreading perspec-
tive, because tobacco companies and smokers will be less able to
spread smoking-related losses if the income from cigarette sales de-
clines dramatically.
C. Corrective Justice
Moral considerations, such as corrective justice, may also support
the shifting of smoking-related health-care costs from injured parties
to those who benefit from smoking.
1. Tobacco Companies as Potential Loss-Bearers
Principles of corrective justice appear to support shifting some
smoking-related losses from victims to tobacco companies. The first
requirement for liability is that the defendant be guilty of some sort of
wrongdoing. Unhappily for tobacco companies, the record is replete
with evidence of morally reprehensible conduct. For example,
although the tobacco industry was aware of the adverse effects of
smoking as early as the 1960s, 153 it concealed this information from
the public154 and steadfastly denied the existence of any link between
152. See Ausness, supra note 140, at 447 ("Consequently, if cigarette companies are sub-
jected to excessive liability, they may be unable to function effectively as loss spreaders.").
153. See McLeod, supra note 98, at 1059 ("A sufficient wealth of studies were performed and
published between the early 1900's and the 1960's to put the tobacco industry on notice of the
dangers inherent in cigarette smoking.").
154. See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and
Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429, 1452-53 (1994)
("[T]here is evidence that the cigarette industry as a whole has worked long and hard to conceal
the true extent of the dangers of smoking.").
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smoking and cancer.155 Even today, cigarette advertising subtly sug-
gests that smoking is consistent with an active and healthy life style. 56
Recent evidence also indicates that cigarette manufacturers have
long been aware of the addictive qualities of nicotine. Yet, they not
only suppressed this information,'57 also secretly manipulated nicotine
levels in cigarettes, presumably in order to keep their customers ad-
dicted. 5 ' Finally, tobacco companies have intentionally directed their
advertising and marketing efforts at underage consumers.159 They
know that most smokers take up the habit in their teenage or pre-
teenage years. 60 Tobacco companies are also aware of the fact that
individuals who begin to smoke before the age of eighteen are less
likely to quit smoking and are more likely to remain smokers for
life.' 6 ' Unfortunately, cigarette manufacturers have been extremely
successful in their efforts to get young persons to smoke:162 more than
3 million teenagers smoke and another 1 million use smokeless
tobacco. 63
At first blush, therefore, injured smokers appear to have a moral
claim to compensation. Many smokers suffer severe health problems
because of smoking, and as many as a third of them eventually die
155. See Krebs, supra note 63, at 676 ("Even after the [1964 Surgeon General's] Report, the
tobacco companies claimed there was a lack of a direct causal link between smoking and can-
cers."); see also Ross, supra note 133, at 333 ("The tobacco industry still maintains that the causal
link between smoking and disease has not been scientifically established.").
156. See Bruce A. Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should Their Ashes Be
Kicked?, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 195, 238 (1987) ("Current ads continue leaving the unmistakable
impression that smoking is desirable and even associated with healthy activities.").
157. See Griffith, supra note 64, at 607 (stating that state officials contend that cigarette com-
panies suppressed information about nicotine addiction and manipulated nicotine levels in
cigarettes).
158. See Meade, supra note 79, at 133-35 (stating that documents obtained from Brown &
Williamson's files revealed the existence of such practices by the tobacco industry).
159. See Vandall, supra note 9, at 420 ("Cigarette marketing is aimed at the teen and pre-
teen market, and their aim is accurate.").
160. See Levin, supra note 156, at 211 ("Many smokers begin their deadly addiction in their
teenage years or even earlier."); Rimer, supra note 1, at 1242 ("Ten percent start smoking by the
fourth grade and almost two-thirds start by the tenth grade.").
161. See Jennifer McCullough, Note, Lighting Up the Battle Against the Tobacco Industry:
New Regulations Prohibiting Cigarette Sales to Minors, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 709, 719 (1997)
("[Situdies have shown that if a smoker begins to smoke before the age of eighteen, then that
individual will probably remain a smoker for life, but if a smoker begins later in adulthood, there
is more of a chance that he or she will quit.").
162. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 80, at 65 ("Cigarette advertising plays a preeminent
role in encouraging children to smoke.").
163. See U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG
YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5 (1994).
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from smoking-related diseases.164 Nevertheless, the moral situation of
injured smokers is ambiguous. From the perspective of corrective jus-
tice, the strength of injured smokers' claims depends upon whether
they are viewed as helpless victims of smoking addiction or as willing
participants in a deadly lottery. According to the former view, to-
bacco companies, through the use of skillful marketing techniques
prey upon vulnerable and naive teenagers and seduce them into
smoking before they are fully aware of the consequences of their ac-
tions. 165 And once they begin to smoke, smokers cannot stop. The
nicotine in cigarettes is highly addictive. 166 This is why so many smok-
ers have tried to quit, but have failed. 167 If this view of smokers is
accurate, one may argue that they should not be held morally respon-
sible for their injuries.
168
However, it is also possible to argue that smokers have knowingly
and voluntarily chosen to accept the risks associated with smoking.'
69
The health risks of smoking have been matters of general knowledge
since the 1960s17° and perhaps even earlier.' 71 Moreover, studies
164. See U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 206
(1989) ("As many as one-third of heavy smokers aged 35 years will die before age 85 of diseases
caused by their smoking."); Wertheimer, supra note 91, at 419-20 ("[T]here is evidence that
tobacco products will kill one third of all persons who start smoking as teenagers.").
165. See Swecker, supra note 89, at 1519 ("Cigarette advertisements featuring a 'sunglass-
sporting, phallic-nosed' camel named Joe, surrounded by his 'cool, jazz-playing, pool-hustling,
poker-playing, cigarette-smoking crowd of camel friends,' have been accused of enticing children
to smoke.").
166. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 80, at 65 ("The nicotine in tobacco products is addic-
tive."); McLeod, supra note 98, at 1055 ("Further, the medical profession has concluded that
cigarette smoking is addictive."); Rimer, supra note 1, at 1243 ("Smoking cigarettes is as addic-
tive as using heroin or cocaine."); Vandall, supra note 9, at 419 ("Careful examination of the data
makes it clear that cigarettes and other forms of tobacco are addicting.").
167. See Henges, supra note 116 at 575-76 ("Of the 17 million who try to quit smoking each
year, only 1.3 million are successful."); Rimer, supra note 1, at 1243 ("Once hooked, three of
four smokers are sorry they started, and nine of ten have tried to quit at least once but failed.").
168. In the context of tort liability, this addiction claim is used to overcome the freedom of
choice argument raised by the tobacco companies. See Rabin, supra note 54, at 871 ("The obvi-
ous tactic for countering the freedom of choice defense is a head-on rebuttal based on the addic-
tive character of tobacco-a tactic that has come to be a central feature of the second wave
litigation.").
169. See LeBel, supra note 35, at 483 ("One of the more distinctive features of tobacco-
related harms is that the bulk of those harms occur to people who voluntarily begin to use the
products which, at least for some time now, have been accompanied by warnings of the risks that
these harms will occur.").
170. See Garner, supra note 11, at 271 ("The health consequences of cigarette smoking were
well documented during the 1960s."); Note, supra note 10, at 813 ("Knowledge that smoking has
potential health risks has become widespread in the two decades since the first Surgeon Gen-
eral's Report on smoking and the subsequent public debate over smoking's health hazards.").
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show that most smokers, even young smokers, 7 2 are aware of the gen-
eral health risks of smoking.'73 Furthermore, it is by no means clear
that nicotine is so addictive that smokers cannot quit smoking.
174
Nearly half of those who once smoked have successfully quit.175 Con-
sequently, the moral claim of injured smokers to compensation for
smoking-related health costs may not be as strong as it first appears.
Injured nonsmokers and public social services providers, on the
other hand, clearly occupy the moral high ground. Injured non-
smokers can claim that the risks associated with secondhand smoke
have been discovered only recently. Therefore, one cannot say that
injured nonsmokers are morally blameworthy for voluntarily exposing
themselves to the risk of secondhand smoke exposure. And, of
course, public social services providers have not contributed in any
way to health problems caused by smoking and, thus, can make a
strong moral claim to reimbursement for the costs of treating smok-
ing-related diseases.
2. Smokers as Potential Loss-Bearers
The moral condition of smokers is quite different from that of
tobacco companies. Smokers have not marketed dangerous products,
nor have they concealed health-related smoking risks from the public.
Instead, the moral claim of injured smokers rests on the notion that
171. See Rabin, supra note 54, at 856 ("But in a critical development, the most widely read
magazine of the day, The Reader's Digest, long a foe of the tobacco industry, published a series
of articles [in the 1950s] vividly translating the risks of smoking into terms everyone could
understand.").
172. See Reiter, supra note 127, at 459 ("Ninety-nine percent of young people (ages seven to
fourteen) know that smoking causes lung cancer."); Viscusi, supra note 142, at 553 ("Quite
simply, the standard characterization of youths as being uninformed and ignorant of the risks
they face is not in line with either the evidence with respect to smoking risks or recent studies on
the psychology of risk perception.").
173. See Donald W. Garner, Cigarette Dependency at Civil Liability of Cigarette Manufactur-
ers: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1429 (1980) ("Just as the defendant can no
longer claim he did not really know of the harm tobacco use can cause, the plaintiff can no
longer claim that he is surprised at the detrimental effects of cigarette smoking."); Viscusi, supra
note 142, at 552 ("Available evidence suggests that smokers are generally cognizant of the risks
they face."). But see Henges, supra note 116, at 588-59 ("Many smokers began smoking prior to
the 1960's, believing that it was safe, and they had no way of knowing that it was addictive.").
174. See Schwartz, supra note 101, at 521-22 ("[A]Ulegedly addictive substances such as to-
bacco and alcohol do not generate physical withdrawal costs that are so high as to overcome the
will of an ordinary person to discontinue use when she comes to believe that the costs of con-
suming exceed the benefits.").
175. See Rabin, supra note 54, at 871 ("[T]he data indicate that about one-half of long-term
smokers have managed to quit."); Taxin, supra note 118, at 225 ("Indeed, nearly half of all per-
sons who were once regular smokers have successfully quit.").
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smokers as a group, having benefited from smoking, have an obliga-
tion to compensate those who are injured in the course of an activity
in which every member of the group has voluntarily participated.
176
Similar reasoning might be invoked to justify shifting smoking-related
health costs from injured nonsmokers to smokers. Smokers as a
group derive benefits from an activity that imposes losses on nonpar-
ticipants. In this sense, smokers have obtained a benefit at the ex-
pense of injured nonsmokers and ought to compensate them for these
losses. Arguably, this reasoning also supports the reimbursement of
smoking-related health care costs to public social services providers.
3. Public Social Services Providers as Potential Loss-Bearers
Requiring public social services providers to compensate injured
smokers or injured nonsmokers has no moral basis. Public institutions
are not responsible for the existence of smoking-related diseases, nor
do they benefit in any way from smoking.
D. Vindication
Arguably, the conduct of some parties, particularly tobacco com-
panies, may be such that loss-shifting is an appropriate means to vindi-
cate the rights of injured parties.
1. Tobacco Comppanies as Potential Loss-Bearers
Considerable evidence shows that tobacco companies have en-
gaged in a deliberate and continuous pattern of wrongdoing during
the past three decades. 177 As mentioned earlier, they put a product on
the market that they knew was dangerous;178 they suppressed infor-
mation about the health risks of smoking179 and the addictive charac-
teristics of nicotine; 80 and they manipulated nicotine levels in
176. See James, supra note 106, at 550 ("If a certain type of loss is the more or less inevitable
by-product of a desirable but dangerous form of activity it may well be just to distribute such
losses among all the beneficiaries of the activity though it would be unjust to visit them severally
upon those individuals who happened to be the faultless instruments causing them.").
177. See Meade, supra note 79, at 133-35 (discussing evidence of tobacco industry wrongdo-
ing revealed in Brown & Williamson Co. documents).
178. See McLeod, supra note 98, at 1059 (stating that the tobacco industry knew, or should
have known, about numerous studies performed and published between the early 1900s and the
1960s that demonstrated the dangers of cigarette smoking).
179. See Wertheimer, supra note 91, at 1452-53 (proposing that the cigarette industry at-
tempted to conceal the dangers of smoking from the public).
180. See Griffith, supra note 54, at 607 (stating that cigarette companies allegedly suppressed
information about nicotine addiction).
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cigarettes in order to keep their customers addicted.18' Tobacco com-
panies also committed wrongful acts against injured smokers by with-
holding information that might have prevented their injuries from
occurring. Arguably, a public trial, at which the wrongdoing of the
tobacco industry is identified and condemned, will serve to vindicate
community values of honesty and fair-dealing.
Alternatively, the claims of injured smokers for vindication are
considerably weakened to the extent that they have freely and know-
ingly accepted the risks inherent in smoking. Injured nonsmokers,
however, have a stronger vindicatory claim. Unlike injured smokers,
nonsmoking victims of secondhand smoke did not contribute to their
injuries in any way. They are morally innocent and thus in a good
position to hold tobacco companies accountable for wrongfully sub-
jecting them to injury. Public social services providers are also mor-
ally blameless. However, a vindicatory claim on their behalf does not
seem particularly compelling because it is hard to picture public social
services providers as victims.
2. Smokers as Potential Loss-Bearers
Although smokers may have a moral obligation to compensate
those who are injured by smoking, there is nothing in their conduct
that justifies the need for vindication. This is particularly true if we
view smokers as victims of wrongdoing rather than as deliberate
wrongdoers. Consequently, neither injured smokers, nor injured non-
smokers or public social services providers, need to seek vindication
against smokers.
3. Public Social Services Providers as Potential Loss-Bearers
Public social services providers are not culpable and, therefore,
cannot be held liable on the basis of any vindicatory interest on the
part of injured smokers or nonsmokers.
E. Conclusion
If resource allocation goals are important, tobacco companies and
smokers, and not public social services providers, should legitimately
be required to compensate all injured parties. However, various
forms of market failure may defeat this objective and make things
even worse from the resource allocation perspective. Therefore, it
181. See Meade, supra note 79, at 133-35 (proposing that tobacco companies controlled nico-
tine levels in cigarettes).
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will be necessary to exercise a degree of caution when shifting losses
in order to allocate economic resources more efficiently.
If loss-spreading is the principal objective, we can look to tobacco
companies, smokers, and public social services providers to compen-
sate injured smokers and injured nonsmokers. However, it is prob-
able that neither tobacco companies, nor smokers, will have sufficient
resources to spread all of the health-related costs that smoking im-
poses upon society.
An obligation on the part of tobacco companies to provide com-
pensation may also arise under principles of corrective justice because
of prior wrongdoing. Although the corrective justice claims of injured
smokers are a bit dubious, those of injured nonsmokers and public
social services providers appear to be quite strong. Smokers may also
be required to provide compensation to injured smokers, injured non-
smokers, and public social services providers on the theory that smok-
ers, have received a benefit from a dangerous activity and, therefore,
can be expected to help participants and bystanders who have been
injured as a result of their activity.
Finally, smokers and nonsmokers may seek compensation against
tobacco companies for their injuries in order to vindicate principles of
public morality. At the same time, lack of culpability would probably
preclude such claims against smokers and public social services
providers.
V. A PROPOSED COMPENSATION PLAN
In this portion of the Article, I propose a plan whereby the fed-
eral government would reimburse public health-care providers for the
costs of treating indigents for smoking-related diseases. The plan
would make no provision for the compensation of individual smokers.
A federal compensation board would administer the program and
have the power to promulgate eligibility standards. The program
would be financed by an increase in the existing cigarette excise tax.
A. Tort Liability Versus an Administrative Compensation Scheme
Some commentators contend that tobacco companies should be
held liable under principles of strict tort liability, just like other sellers
of defective products.'82 In theory, the imposition of tort liability
182. See McLeod, supra note 98, at 1056 ("Courts should hold the tobacco industry, as manu-
facturers of the most harmful product on the market today, to the same strict liability standards
as any other industry in the United States.").
[Vol. 27
HEALTH COSTS OF SMOKING
upon tobacco companies will lead to a more efficient allocation of re-
sources by ensuring that smoking-relating health-care costs are borne
by those who benefit from the marketing of cigarettes.183 Tort liability
should also provide a source of compensation for smoking victims,
thereby spreading smoking-related losses more fairly.'84 Tort liability
may also act as an instrument to achieve corrective justice'85 or vindi-
catory' 86 goals.
However, there are a number of problems with using tort law as a
mechanism for shifting smoking-related losses. First of all, because
any injured party can bring a tort action, there is no way to control
either the size or number of claims that may be brought against to-
bacco companies. This means that tobacco companies would face the
prospect of crippling liability. To make matters worse, existing to-
bacco companies would also face severe competition from new ciga-
rette producers who could sell their products for less because they
would not be liable for injuries caused by past cigarette sales.' 87 If the
combined effect of massive liability and declining markets forced ex-
isting tobacco companies to go out of business, victims would be left
with no source of compensation.1
8
An even greater concern is the cost of tort litigation. 89 In gen-
eral, tort victims receive only about half of the money producers and
insurers pay out to settle claims or judgments, while litigation costs
account for the remaining half.' 90 In contrast, other compensation
183. See Ausness, supra note 49, at 1087.
184. See Note, supra note 10, at 821 ("The industry's ability to spread the costs of smokers'
losses among all who benefit from tobacco manufacture and consumption suggests that imposing
liability on the industry would lead to a more equitable sharing of the burdens than is currently
the case.").
185. See Owen, supra note 96, at 430.
186. See Little, supra note 103, at 869.
187. See Ausness, supra note 140, at 447.
188. See id. New entrants into the market might attempt to limit their tort liability by delib-
erately planning to go out of business before the health claims of their customers begin to ma-
ture. See Taxin, supra note 118, at 247.
189. See generally Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based Compensation System for Prod-
uct-Related Injuries, 58 U. Pir. L. REV. 669, 686-87 (1997) (discussing the high cost of tort
litigation).
190. See Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil
Justice's Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 492 (1987) ("[Olverall, plaintiffs appear to receive, in
net compensation, about fifty percent of tort litigation expenditures."); Robert L. Rabin, Some
Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 35 (1988) ("Reduced to a
single figure, injury victims were receiving slightly less than half of every dollar expended by the
system on accident claims.").
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systems, such as private insurance, workers compensation, and Social
Security, cost much less to operate.' 9'
For these reasons, tort law appears to be too crude and expensive
to serve as an effective mechanism for the compensation of smoking-
related health claims. In contrast, statutory compensation schemes
appear to be more attractive than tort law. They are much cheaper to
operate, and they can be designed to achieve narrowly targeted objec-
tives. My proposal will involve a statutory compensation program
managed by a federal administrative agency.
B. Policy Considerations
Possible loss-bearers under this proposal include tobacco compa-
nies and smokers. Technically, tobacco companies would pay the ex-
cise tax at the production stage; however, I assume that all or most of
the tax would ultimately be passed on to smokers. The only benefi-
ciaries under this proposal would be public social services providers.
While the principal policy justification for this proposal is correc-
tive justice, the increased excise tax might also have beneficial effects
on resource allocation as well.' 9 ' In Part IV, I concluded that it was
consistent with accepted principles of corrective justice to shift smok-
ing-related losses to tobacco companies. Tobacco companies have not
only profited from an injury-producing activity, but they have engaged
in active wrongdoing. While smokers are not morally culpable like
tobacco companies are, they have voluntarily participated in, and ben-
efited from, an activity that they know harms others. Consequently, I
believe that principles of corrective justice can be invoked to impose a
legal duty on smokers to compensate some of those who are injured
by smoking.
The potential beneficiaries under this scheme include injured
smokers, injured nonsmokers, and public social services providers.
Arguably, all injured smokers and nonsmokers should be able to as-
sert a claim on corrective justice grounds to compensation for smok-
ing-related injuries. Without denying the legitimacy of these claims, I
191. See Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths
and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127, 135 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991)
("'[Tlransactions costs consume 30 percent of the costs of the workers' compensation system, 15
percent of health insurance, and just 1 percent of the social security system.").
192. A significant price increase might not affect the smoking habits of adult cigarette smok-
ers, but it might discourage younger individuals from beginning or continuing to smoke. See
Ross, supra note 133, at 337. If young people reduced their consumption of cigarettes, the mar-
ket for such products would eventually decline as older smokers died off. See Nelkin, supra note
7, at 340.
[Vol. 27
HEALTH COSTS OF SMOKING
would argue that public providers of social services, or rather the non-
smoking taxpayers who enable them to provide these services, have
the strongest corrective justice claim. Nonsmoking taxpayers contrib-
ute a disproportionate share to the maintenance of publicly financed
health care programs such as Medicaid.193 This is because non-
smokers seldom require treatment for smoking-related illness. Smok-
ers, on the other hand, not only require treatment for such illnesses,
but also tend to rely more upon public health care programs than
nonsmokers. 194
C. Eligibility Requirements
If the proposed compensation scheme cannot afford to compen-
sate everyone who is injured by smoking, it will be necessary to im-
pose some restrictions on eligibility.
1. Restrictions on Eligible Beneficiaries
In theory, the proposed compensation system could provide ben-
efits for everyone who has been injured by smoking. This would in-
clude injured smokers, injured nonsmokers, and public providers of
social services. However, I believe that it would not be practical to
provide full compensation to all of these claimants.
First of all, a program that attempted to compensate everyone
would require at least $50 billion and possibly as much as $100 billion,
per year to operate, depending on the level of compensation provided
by the program. Assuming that 24 billion packs of cigarettes are sold
each year, a $50 billion compensation program would require an ex-
cise tax of more than $2 a pack, while an excise tax of $4 a pack would
be needed to finance a $100 billion program. I do not believe that the
tobacco industry could survive if excise taxes of this magnitude were
suddenly imposed on the sale of cigarettes.
In addition, compensating all injured parties would require the
creation of a large federal entitlement program. More than 450,000
persons die each year from smoking-related diseases' 95 and millions of
others are seriously injured as a result of smoking. If each of these
193. See Garner, supra note 11, at 272-73 ("In short, the nonsmoking taxpayer, who gener-
ally lives a longer, healthier life than the average smoker, will draw fewer benefits from and pay
a disproportionately greater amount into welfare programs than the smoker.").
194. See Gangarosa et al., supra note 92, at 92-93 ("Heavy abusers of alcohol and tobacco are
more likely to be poorly educated, underemployed and medically indigent.").
195. See Wertheimer, supra note 91, at 409-10 ("There is no other product which, when used
as directed, kills some 450,000 Americans each year.").
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victims were allowed to seek compensation, the costs of administering
a program of such magnitude would be quite high, and the program
would encounter enormous start-up problems. Therefore, it seems
better to start with a more modest compensation program.
Assuming that the program could not compensate everyone who
suffers a smoking-related injury, we must now decide who will be al-
lowed to participate. Injured smokers seem to be the easiest group of
potential claimants to eliminate. The sheer size of this class would
overwhelm the program both financially and administratively. There
are literally millions of injured smokers who would be eligible for
compensation if their claims were allowed. But, as suggested earlier,
it is doubtful that an excise tax would produce enough money to pay
this many claims. The only alternative-other than drastically scaling
back the level of compensation-would be to partly finance the pro-
gram from general revenues. However, compensating smokers from
general revenues would not be consistent with the program's correc-
tive justice rationale. Not only are nonsmoking taxpayers innocent of
any wrongdoing, but the claims of injured smokers are morally
dubious.
In addition, the sheer number of potential claims by injured
smokers militates against including smokers in the compensation pool.
If individual smokers were allowed to seek compensation, the agency
that administered the program would be swamped by claims and
would be unable to process them in any sort of timely fashion. It is
also expensive and time consuming to adjudicate highly individualized
issues of fact, such as causation and damages. However, this problem
would be unavoidable if individual smokers were allowed to submit
claims to the compensation board.
Conversely, there is a strong argument for allowing injured non-
smokers to seek compensation. Approximately 3,000 persons are
killed each year from exposure to secondhand smoke, and the number
of those injured is likely to be relatively small as well. Consequently,
a program that authorized claims by injured nonsmokers could easily
be financed by an excise tax on cigarette sales and would not require
substantial resources to administer. Moreover, injured nonsmokers
are innocent of any wrongdoing and, therefore, can make a strong
corrective justice claim to compensation.
However, one problem with including injured nonsmokers in the
proposed compensation scheme exists. At the present time, it is diffi-
cult to determine when exposure to secondhand smoke causes injury.
To avoid case-by-case adjudications of this nature, the compensation
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board would have to establish a "rule-of-thumb" to determine what
types of diseases could be attributed to secondhand smoke exposure.
Furthermore, even if this were done, the board would still have to
make individual determinations about other factual questions.
196
An excise-tax financed compensation program is ideally suited to
reimburse public services providers for the costs of treating indigent
smokers and nonsmokers. The program could be limited to health-
care costs or expanded to include disability costs as well. The cost of
such a program would be high, perhaps $20 billion, but it would not be
prohibitive. Probably the best approach, in terms of administrative
convenience, would be to limit compensation to smoking-related
Medicaid costs paid by the states. That way the board would only
have to deal with fifty claimants.
2. Restrictions on Compensable Injuries
If individuals, such as injured nonsmokers, were allowed to seek
compensation from the board, excluding nonpecuniary damages, such
as emotional distress or pain and suffering, from the available recov-
ery might be desirable. Although economic theory supports a ban on
nonpecuniary damages,197 the primary reason for limiting compensa-
tion to pecuniary losses is administrative efficiency. Nonpecuniary
damages are subjective and require individualized fact-finding; 98 pe-
cuniary damages, on the other hand, can be determined relatively eas-
ily by the application of objective criteria.' 99
It may also be necessary to exclude or limit certain types of injury
from consideration. For example, the statute may permit the board to
pay for full treatment costs of diseases such as lung cancer, which is
196. For example, the board would have to determine whether the victim was a nonsmoker,
whether the victim was exposed to secondhand smoke and, if so, whether this exposure was
sufficient to cause injury. Furthermore, the board would have to determine whether the claim-
ant's injury was caused by exposure to secondhand smoke, and the extent of the claimant's
damages.
197. See Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1435 (1987) ("There is little reason to think that an optimal compensation
scheme would include recovery for pain and suffering.").
198. See Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to "No Cause" Liability in Blood Prod-
ucts Litigation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 125 (1995) ("First, the inclusion of nonpecuniary awards
would increase the need for individualized fact discovery, diminishing the scheme's ability to
provide compensation quickly.").
199. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 910 (1989) ("Computation of 'special' damages-items of
economic expense that plaintiffs must specifically plead and prove, like medical bills or wage
loss-seem relatively straightforward and amenable to common-sense resolution without de-
tailed jury instructions.").
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almost entirely smoking-related. However, with other conditions,
such as heart disease, which have numerous causes besides smoking,
Congress might authorize the board to compensate for only a certain
percentage of treatment costs. Not only would this avoid the cost of
making individualized judgments about causation, but it would also
allow Congress to control the overall size of the compensation
program.
D. Funding
A compensation scheme, such as the one described above, can be
financed in various ways. One option would be to rely on general
funding. However, this would be inconsistent with corrective justice
goals because the public rather than the tobacco companies and
smokers would be required to bear the cost of smoking. Furthermore,
funding from general revenue sources would not affect the price of
cigarettes and thus would sacrifice the cost-internalization advantages
that other methods of funding would provide. Finally, if only public
social services providers were eligible for compensation, the program
would amount to nothing more than a transfer of tax revenues from
the federal government to state and local governments.
Another approach would be to impose civil liability on tobacco
companies for smoking-related compensation costs paid out by the
program. This would satisfy our corrective justice and resource-allo-
cation concerns because some smoking-related health costs would be
shifted to tobacco companies and smokers. However, this method of
funding would require complicated administrative proceedings to en-
sure that tobacco company liability was determined in accordance
with applicable standards of fairness and procedural due process.
An excise tax on cigarettes seems to be a better method of financ-
ing the compensation scheme. Congress has the constitutional author-
ity to impose an excise tax on cigarettes and has done so for many
years.200 Moreover, for all practical purposes, constitutionally im-
posed tax rates on cigarette manufacturers have no constitutional
limit. Furthermore, the tax does not have to be used for any particu-
lar purpose. Thus, Congress could appropriatley set the excise tax at a
rate that would produce $25 billion, 01 devote as much of this money
as necessary to fund the compensation program, and use the rest for
200. See Nelkin, supra note 7, at 332 (discussing the history of tobacco product taxation).
201. See May, supra note 128, at 1087 (stating that an excise tax of 25 cents per pack would
produce $25 billion per year).
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general revenue purposes. Finally, the excise tax rate can fluctuate to
meet the revenue needs of the compensation program.
Although the compensation program proposed in this Article is a
modest one, it will shift some of the costs of smoking back to smokers,
it will be relatively simple and cheap to operate, and it will not put the
tobacco industry out of business.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tobacco industry's long-standing immunity has come to an
end. It is clear that tobacco companies and smokers are going to have
to assume responsibility for a greater share of the health-care costs
related to smoking. However, it is not clear how this will be done.
My own view is that we should proceed cautiously. Therefore, I have
proposed a relatively modest statutory compensation program as a
possible first step.
